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The World Bank and The International Monetary Fund 
have been pushing client countries toward privatization.  
In Latin America these organizations have advocated 
the “Chilean Model” of radical and rapid privatization.  
In the Chilean case, the sudden privatization of water 
resources resulted in a high degree of monopolization of 
water supply by the national hydroelectric generating 
companies to the detriment of the agricultural sector and 
cities that must pay exorbitant prices for added water 
supplies. 
 
The program of privatization of public services in the 
United Kingdom provides us with the most extensive 
record of privatization and its consequences.  This 
program was pushed dogmatically by the Thatcher 
government, starting with British Telecom in 1983, 
British Gas in 1986, British Airways in 1987, the water 
and wastewater treatment sector in 1989, electric 
production and distribution in 1990-91, and the railroads 
in 1994.  The results have been quite mixed, from 
outstanding success in the gas, electricity, and telecom 
sector to chaos in the railroads, and great public 
dissatisfaction in the water sector. 
 
The motivation for water sector privatization (besides 
the market philosophy held by the Tory government) 
was a backlog of maintenance and repair estimated to be 
24 billion pounds that the government didn't want to 
bear and the obvious need to raise water charges for 
which the government preferred not to take the blame.  
Prior to privatization in 1989, the water sector consisted 
of ten major river authorities that provided water 
supplies, waste water treatment, and ambient water 
quality management in the major river basins, 
supplemented by 25 historical water supply companies 
serving local areas.  Ownership shares for these entities 
were created and “floated” at quite advantageous prices 
to be sure that buyers would be found.  The offerings 
were heavily oversubscribed and the successful buyers 
were mostly the three large French water companies: 
Compagnie General des Eaux, Compagnie Lyonnaise 
des Eaux, and Societe d'Amenagement Urbain et Rural.  
Some of the companies remained under British control. 
 
The water sector is the closest approximation to the 
ideal “natural monopoly” of economic texts.  The 
required infrastructure is costly and specialized.  
Duplication by potential competitors would be 
prohibitive.  Thus one cannot count on competition of 
the usual sort to maintain reasonable prices and levels of 
service.  The British solution has been to establish (for 
each of the privatized public service sectors) a very 
strong regulatory office–the Office of Water Services 
(OFWAT) in the case of water.  OFWAT exercises its 
control through “price cap” regulation, “yardstick 
competition,” and public pressure through citizen 
advisory groups. 
 
The major result has been a strong (and outspoken) 
public discontent with the private companies.  Water 
charges have increased from 100 percent to 200 percent.  
The salaries of company directors have been very high 
in comparison with similar industries, while the prices 
of the company stocks (large numbers held by company 
officials) have increased tremendously in anticipation of 
continued high profits.  (The average stock price for the 
25 water supply companies has increased by a factor of 
ten!)  The number of service shutoffs has increased 
dramatically – a social issue of great concern. 
 
Evaluation of the companies' performances has been 
confounded by the occurrence of two severe droughts 
since privatization.  The companies clearly have 
invested heavily in repairs and capacity expansion.  A 
major issue has been reduction of water losses through 
leaks.  Residential users typically are not metered 
because of the age of the systems and the earlier 
plenitude of raw water, so that isolating leaks has been 
difficult.  Because of the severe control by OFWAT, the 
operations of the industry are more transparent and, to 
some extent, more accountable.   Eventually, after the 
great backlogs of investment have been filled, there will 
be more effective control of water charges.  What will 
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be the ultimate equilibrium of the industry?  
Consolidation of companies is already underway. 
 
What have we learned?  Clearly, although privatization 
doesn't work magic in the public service area, it has 
been quite successful in those industries where the 
technology is more “flexible” in the sense of permitting 
multicompany use of facilities.  In the water sector, a 
loosely regulated public service has been replaced by a 
heavily regulated private service.  The natural monopoly 
problem has not been overcome.  “Price cap regulation” 
and “yardstick competition” have proved more feeble 
instruments than anticipated.  The new equilibrium of 
the industry will probably be superior to the situation 
prior to privatization, but the costs of the transition to 
equilibrium are quite significant and should not be 
ignored in weighing the privatization decision.  
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